The sparse vector technique is a powerful differentially private primitive that allows an analyst to check whether queries in a stream are greater or lesser than a threshold. This technique has a unique property -the algorithm works by adding noise with a finite variance to the queries and the threshold, and guarantees privacy that only degrades with (a) the maximum sensitivity of any one query in stream, and (b) the number of positive answers output by the algorithm. Recent work has developed variants of this algorithm, which we call generalized private threshold testing, and are claimed to have privacy guarantees that do not depend on the number of positive or negative answers output by the algorithm. These algorithms result in a significant improvement in utility over the sparse vector technique for a given privacy budget, and have found applications in frequent itemset mining, feature selection in machine learning and generating synthetic data.
INTRODUCTION
A popular building block for ǫ-differentially private query answering is the Laplace mechanism. Given a set of queries Q as input, the Laplace mechanism adds noise drawn independently from the Laplace distribution to each query in Q. Adding noise with standard deviation of √ 2/ǫ to each of the queries in Q ensures (∆Q · ǫ)-differential privacy, where ∆Q is the sensitivity of Q, or the sum of the changes in each of the queries Q ∈ Q when one row is added or removed from the input database. Increasing the number of queries increases the sensitivity, and thus for a fixed privacy budget the mechanism's accuracy is poor for large sets of queries (unless the queries operate on disjoint subsets of the domain).
The sparse vector technique (SVT) [7] is an algorithm that allows testing whether a stream of queries is greater or lesser than a threshold τ . SVT works by adding noise to both the threshold τ and to each of the queries Q ∈ Q. If noise with standard deviation of √ 2/ǫ is added to the threshold and each of the queries, SVT can be shown to satisfy c∆ǫ-differential privacy, where ∆ is the maximum sensitivity of any single query in Q and c is the number of positive answers (greater than threshold) that the algorithm outputs. Note that the privacy guarantee does not depend on the number of queries with negative answers, and the sensitivity does not necessarily increase with an increase in number of queries.
Recent work has explored the possibility of extending this technique to eliminate the dependence on the number of positive answers (c). We call this idea generalized private threshold testing, and it works like SVT -noise is added to both the threshold and each of the queries using noise whose standard deviation only depends only on ǫ and maximum sensitivity ∆ of a single query in Q. Generalized private threshold testing has been claimed to ensure differential privacy with the privacy parameter having no dependence on the number of positive or negative queries! Hence, generalized private threshold testing has been used to develop algorithms with high utility for private frequent itemset mining [6] , feature selection in private classification [9] and generating synthetic data [2] .
In this article, we critically analyze the privacy properties of generalized private threshold testing. We make the following contributions:
• We show that generalized private threshold testing does not satisfy ǫ-differential privacy, where ǫ does not depend on the number of queries being tested. We identify a specific claim in the privacy analysis in prior work that is assumed to hold, but does not in reality.
• We show specific examples of neighboring databases, queries and outputs that violate the requirement that the algorithm output is insensitive to adding or removing a row in the data.
• We display an attack algorithm and demonstrate that using generalized private threshold testing could make it possible for adversaries to reconstruct the counts for each cell with high probability, especially the cells with small counts.
Organization: Section 2 surveys concepts on differential privacy and the sparse vector technique. In Section 3, we introduce generalized private threshold testing and its instantiations in prior works. We show that generalized private threshold testing does not satisfy differential privacy in Section 4. We describe an attack algorithm for reconstructing the counts of cells in the input datasets by using generalized private threshold testing in Section 5 and demonstrate our attacks on real datasets.
PRELIMINARIES
Databases: A database D is a multiset of entries whose values come from a domain T = {u1, u2, . . . , u k }. Let n = |D| denote the number of entries in the database.
We represent a database D as a histogram of counts over the domain. That is, D is represented as a vector x ∈ N k where x[i] or xi denotes the true count of entries in D with the i th value of the domain T .
Differential Privacy: We define a neighborhood relation N on databases as follows: Two databases D1 and D2 are considered neighboring datasets if and only if they differ in the presence or absence of a single entry. That is, (D1, D2) ∈ N iff for some t ∈ T , D1 = D2 ∪ {t} or D2 = D1 ∪ {t}. Equivalently, if x1 and x2 are histograms of neighboring databases, ||x1 − x2||1 = 1. An algorithm satisfies differential privacy if its outputs are statistically similar on neighboring databases.
Definition 1 (ǫ-differential privacy).
A randomized algorithm M satisfies ǫ-differential privacy if for any pair of neighboring databases (D1, D2) ∈ N , and ∀S ∈ range(M),
The value of ǫ, called privacy budget, controls the level of the privacy, and limits how much an adversary can distinguish one dataset with its neighboring datasets given an output. Smaller ǫ's correspond to more privacy.
Differentially private algorithms satisfy the following composition properties. Suppose M1(·) and M2(·) be ǫ1-and ǫ2-differentially private algorithms.
• Sequential Compositon: Releasing the outputs of M1(D) and M2(D) satisfies ǫ1 + ǫ2-differential privacy.
• Parallel Composition: Releasing M1(D1) and M2(D2), where D1 ∩D2 = ∅ satisfies max(ǫ1, ǫ2)-differential privacy.
• Postprocessing: For any algorithm M3(·), releasing M3(M1(D)) still satisfies ǫ1-differential privacy. That is, postprocessing an output of a differentially private algorithm does not incur any additional loss of privacy.
Thus, complex differentially private algorithms can be build by composing simpler private algorithms. Laplace Mechanism [3] is one such widely used building that achieves differential privacy that adds noise from a Laplace distribution with a scale proportional to the global sensitivity.
Definition 2 (Global Sensitivity). The global sensitivity of a fuction f : D → R n , denoted as ∆(f ), is defined to be the maximum L1 distance of the output from any two neighboring datasets D1 and D2.
η is a vector of independent random variables drawn from a Laplace distribution with the probability density fuction p(x|λ) = 
Sparse Vector Technique:
Algorithm 1 shows the details of the sparse vector technique (SVT). The input of SVT is a stream of queries Q = {q1, q2, . . . , q k }, where each query q ∈ Q has sensitivity bounded by ∆, a threshold θ, and a limit c. For every query, SVT outputs either ⊥ (negative response) or ⊤ (positive response). SVT works in two steps: (1) Perturb the threshold θ by adding noise drawn from the Laplace distribution with scale Moreover if the number of queries is k and their max sensitivity ∆, with probability at least 1 − δ, for every ai = ⊤, qi > τ − α and for every ai = ⊥, qi < τ + α, where 
Output vi = ⊤ 6:
count ← count + 1 7:
Output vi = ⊥ 9:
end if 10:
if count ≥ c then 11: Abort 12:
end if 13: end for
GENERALIZED PRIVATE THRESH-OLD TESTING
In this section, we describe a method called Generalized Private Threshold Testing (GPTT) (see Algorithm 2) that generalizes variations of the sparse vector technique that do not require a limit on the number of positive (or negative) responses.
GPTT takes as input a dataset D, a set of queries Q = {q1, . . . , qn} with bounded sensitivity ∆, threshold θ and a privacy budget ǫ. For every query GPTT outputs either ⊥ or ⊤ that approximates whether or not the queries are smaller than the threshold. GPTT works exactly like SVT -the threshold is perturbed using noise drawn from Lap(∆/ǫ1) and the queries are perturbed using noise from Lap(∆/ǫ2), and the output is computed by comparing the noisy query answer with the noisy threshold. The only difference is that there is no limit on the number of positive or negative queries.
GPTT is a generalization of variations presented in prior work. Lee and Clifton [6] used GPTT for private frequent itemset mining with ǫ1 = ǫ 4 and ǫ2 = , for generating synthetic data. Stoddard et al [9] observed that the privacy guarantee does not depend on ǫ2 and propose the Private Threshold Testing algorithm that is identical to GPTT with ǫ1 = ǫ and ǫ2 = ∞. Private threshold testing was used for private feature selection for classification.
Privacy Analysis of GPTT
We now extend the privacy analysis from prior work [6, 2, 9 ] to generalized private threshold testing. We will show in the next section that this privacy analysis is flawed and that GPTT does not satisfy differential privacy.
Given any set of queries Q = {q1, . . . , qn}, let the vector v =< v1, . . . , vn >∈ {⊥, ⊤} n denote the output of GPTT. Given any two neighbering databases D1 and Algorithm 2 Generalized Private Threshold Testing Input: Dataset D, a set of queries Q = {q1, . . . , qn} with bounded sensitivity ∆, threshold θ, privacy parameters ǫ1, ǫ2
ifqi <θ then 5:
vi ← ⊥ 6:
vi ← ⊤ 8:
end if 9: end for 10: return v D2, let V1 and V2 denote the output distribution on v when D1 and D2 are the input databases, respectively. We use v <t to denote t−1 previous answers(i.e., v <t =< v1, . . . , vt−1 >). Then we have
Let Hi(x) be the probability that qi is positive (i.e., vi = ⊤) in D when the noisy threshold is x. That is,
Then, given a specific noisy thresholdθ = x, the probability that vi = ⊤ is independent of the answers to previous queries. That is,
Prior work uses the above property of Hi(x) to show that GPTT satisfies 2ǫ1-differential privacy.
Let S = {i | ai = ⊤ and qi(D1) = qi(D2)} and S = {i | ai = ⊤ and qi(D1) = qi(D2)}.
and H 2 i (x) denote the probability that vi = ⊤ in D1 and D2, resp., when the noisy threshold is x. Then we have,
Thus, it is seen that
Therefore,
Remarks: Note that adding noise to the queries is not really required. The above proof will go through even if ǫ2 = ∞. In fact as we will see next, we can achieve the same utility no matter what the value of ǫ2 is.
Utility of GPTT
We first consider the utility of the case when ǫ2 = ∞ (i.e. no noise added to queries), and show that we can achieve (almost) the same utility even when ǫ2 is finite.
Theorem 3. For GPTT with parameters ǫ1 and ǫ2 = ∞, with the probability at least 1 − δ, vi = ⊥ implies qi < θ + α and vi = ⊤ implies qi > θ − α, where
where ∆ is the max sensitivity of input queries.
Proof. All we need to show is that the noise added to the threshold is at most ±α with probability 1 − δ.
), we have
Now we extend the utility for GPTT when ǫ2 < ∞.
Theorem 4. Let D be a database and Q a query set with maximum sensitivity of ∆. For every β, δ > 0, we can use GPTT with parameters ǫ1, ǫ2 < ∞ to determine whether qi < θ + α or qi > θ − α for any qi ∈ Q, with probability (1 − δ)(1 − β), where
Proof. Since the privacy of GPTT does not depend on the number of queries Q (as long as sensitivity is bounded by ∆), we can consider a new query set Q ′ that has t copies {qi1, qi2, . . . , qit} of each query qi ∈ Q. Then for each query qi ∈ Q, we have t independent comparisons of the noisy query answerqij and the noisy thresholdθ. We use the majority of these t results to determine whether qi is smaller or greater thanθ.
We can show that with probability at least 1 − β, we can correctly identify whether qi(D) is greater or lesser than the noisy thresholdθ.
Without loss of generality, suppose qi <θ, then p = P (qi <θ) > 
Thus, there exists a number t s.t. for every qi ∈ Q, we can determine whether qi is smaller or greater thanθ with probability greater than 1 − β |Q| . So all the qi will be correctly judged with probability equals to (1 − β |Q| ) |Q| ≈ 1 − β. We get the desired result by now combining with the proof of Theorem 3.
We can see that the information leaked by GPTT with ǫ2 < ∞ will tend to the information leaked by GPTT with ǫ2 = ∞ as the number of copies t goes to infinity. Thus, we can just focus on the case when ǫ2 = ∞.
GPTT IS NOT PRIVATE
While prior work claims that GPTT is indeed differentially private (as discussed in Section 3), we show that this algorithm does not satisfy the privacy condition. The proof is constructive and will show examples of pairs of neighboring datasets and queries for which GPTT violates differential privacy.
Theorem 5. GPTT does not satisfy ǫ-differential privacy for any finite ǫ.
In the proof of this theorem, we start with the case of ǫ2 = ∞, where the true query answer is compared with the noisy threshold. It is easy to show that GPTT does not satisfy differential privacy in this case, since deterministic information about the queries is leaked. In particular, if vi = ⊥ and vj = ⊤, we are certain that on the input database D, there is some x such that qi(D) < x ≤ qj (D).
The proof of the more general case follows from Theorem 4 which shows that anything that is disclosed by GPTT with ǫ2 = ∞ is also disclosed with high probability (by making sufficient number of copies of the input queries). We present the formal proof below.
Proof. Consider two queries q1 and q2 with sensitivity 1. For special case of GPTT, where ǫ2 = ∞, suppose in dataset D, q1(D) = 0 and q2(D) = 1. Also suppose in a neighboring dataset D ′ , q1(D ′ ) = 1 and q2(D ′ ) = 0. Let the threshold θ be 0. Then, the probability of getting an output v1 = ⊥ and v2 = ⊤ is > 0 under database D; this corresponds to the probability that the noisy threshold is within (0, 1). However, under the neighboring dataset
. Thus for any noisy thresholdθ,
Hence, GPTT with ǫ2 = ∞ does not satisfy differential privacy.
To prove that GPTT does not satisfy differential privacy when ǫ2 < ∞, we construct a similar counterexample as above, except that we use t copies of q1 and q2. So again, let the query set Q = {q1, . . . 
where fǫ(z) and Fǫ(z) are the pdf and cdf respectively of the Laplace distribution with parameter 1/ǫ. Similarly, we have on the neighboring database D ′ ,
)|. Since α ≤ 1, δ is greater than the 75 th percentile of a Laplace distribution with scale 1/ǫ1. That is,
Moreover, note that since Fǫ 2 (z − 1) < Fǫ 2 (z) for all z, we have
Let κ denote the minimum value κ(z) takes over all z ∈ [−δ, δ]; thus κ > 1. Now we get
Thus, we have
Since κ > 1, for every ǫ > 1 there exists a t such that V (v) > e ǫ V ′ (v) which violates differential privacy.
Intuition
We believe that there is a subtle error in the privacy analysis in prior work (discussed in Section 3). Prior work splits the probability V (v) as:
. This decomposition into ⊤ and ⊥ answers are wrong. The main problem comes from the fact that it uses the unconditioned f (x) for all queries, but the distribution of the noisy threshold would be affected given the previous output. To take a simple example, let q1 = m > 0, q2 = 0, θ = 0 and assume v1 = ⊥, v2 = ⊤. For ease of explanation assume ǫ2 = ∞ (but the argument would work for finite ǫ2 as well). Now we can compute the probability of GPTT outputing v1, v2 as
However, if we use the expression above, we have
where F (x) is the distribution function of the noisy threshold.
Actually, the right decomposition should be 
Q and threshold θ. 4: ∀v ∈ T , Let larger(v) be the set {u ∈ T | GPTT outputs ⊤ for dif f (xu, xv)} 5: Construct ordered partition of the domain P = {P1, . . . , Pp}, such that ∀u, v ∈ Pi, larger(u) = larger(v), and ∀u ∈ Pi, v ∈ Pi+1, larger(v) larger(u) 6: return P
RECONSTRUCTING THE DATA US-ING GPTT
In the last section, we showed that generalized private threshold testing does not satisfy ǫ-differential privacy for any ǫ. While this is an interesting result, it still leaves open whether GPTT indeed leaks a significant amount of information from the dataset, and allows attacks like re-identification of individuals based on quasi-identifiers. In this section, we answer this question in the affirmative, and show that generalized private threshold testing may disclose the exact counts of domain values. Exact disclosure of cells with small counts (especially, cells with counts 0, 1 and 2) reveal the presence of unique individuals in the data who can be susceptible to reidentification attacks.
We will show our attack for the special case of GPTT where ǫ2 = ∞. Since GPTT with finite ǫ2 can be made to leak as much information about a set of queries as GPTT with ǫ2 = ∞ (Theorem 4) with high probability, we will not separately consider that case.
In our attack, we use a set of difference queries that compute the difference between the counts of pairs of domain elements.
Definition 4 (Difference Query). Let u1, u2 ∈ T be a pair of domain elements, and let x1 and x2 be their counts in a dataset D. The difference query dif f (u1, u2) is given by
Note that each dif f (u, v) query has sensitivity ∆ = 1.
Our attack algorithm is defined in Algorithm 3. Given the input dataset D with domain T , we apply GPTT (ǫ2 = ∞) to the set of all difference queries using all pairs of domain elements u, v ∈ T . We use a threshold θ = ⌈ 1 ǫ log 1 δ ⌉. Pairs of domain elements u, v ∈ T are grouped together if for all w ∈ T , GPTT outputs the same value for both dif f (u, w) and dif f (v, w). This results in a partitioning of the domain. Further, for every domain element u, we define larger(u) to be the set of v ∈ T such that GPTT output ⊤ for dif f (v, u). These are the domain elements that satisfy xv − xu >θ, whereθ is the noisy threshold. We order the partitions such that elements u ∈ Pi have a bigger larger(u) set than elements v ∈ Pj , for j > i.
We can show that the ordered partitioning P imposes an ordering on the counts in the database D.
Lemma 1. Let D be a database on domain T . Let P = {P1, . . . , Pp} be the ordered paritioning of T output by Algorithm 3. Then with probability at least 1 − δ, for all 1 ≤ ℓ < m ≤ p, ui ∈ P ℓ , uj ∈ Pm, we have xi < xj.
Proof. Let 1 ≤ ℓ < m ≤ p, and letθ be the noisy threshold. Since θ = ⌈ 1 ǫ log 1 δ ⌉, with probability at least 1 − δ,θ > 0. For any ui ∈ P ℓ and uj ∈ Pm, larger(uj) larger(ui). Therefore, there exists u k ∈ T such that x k − xi >θ, but x k − xj >θ. Therefore, xi < xj.
Let Si ⊂ T denote the set of domain elements that have count equal to i in dataset D. It is easy to see that for every Si there is some P ∈ P output by Algorithm 3 such that Si ⊆ P . We next show that for certain datasets there is an m > 0 such that the sets corresponding to small counts 0 ≤ i ≤ m are exactly reproduced in the partitioning output by Algorithm 3. Since i ∈ [0, m], with probability at least 1−δ,θ +i ≤ m + 2α < k. Thus ∅ = S ⌈θ+i⌉ ⊂ larger(u) \ larger(v). So we have larger(v) larger(u) and Si,Si+1 will not appear in the same Pi ∈ P.
Furthermore, since we know S0, . . . Sm belong to separate Pi and we have P = {P0, P1, . . . , Pp} be the ordered partition. Thus, we have Pi = Si for i ∈ [0, m].
Theorem 6 shows that for datasets that have at least one domain element having a count equal to i for all i ∈ [0, k], we can exactly tell the counts for those domain elements with count in [0, k − 2α] with high probability. A number of datasets satisfy the assumption that counts in [0, k] all have support. For instance, for datasets that are drawn from a Zipfian distribution, the size of Si is in expectation inversely proportional to the count i, and thus all small counts will have support for datasets of sufficiently large size.
We also find that a number of real world datasets satisfy the assumption that counts in [0, k] all have support. 
aP ←c P |P |
6:
We guess the count of cells in P is round(aP ) 7: end for Table 1 shows the features of some real world datasets. Adult is a histogram constructed from U.S. Census data [5] on the "capitol loss" attribute. MedicalCost is a histogram of personal medical expenses from the survey [1] . Income is the histogram on "personal income" attribute from [8] . HEPTH is a histogram constructed using the citation network among high energy physics pre-prints on arXiv. The attributes Domain and Scale in Table 1 correspond to the size of T and the number of tuples in the datasets. The feature k for each dataset means that Si = ∅ for all i ∈ [0, k].
However, the above attack assumes some prior knowledge about the dataset. Specifically, we assume that the attacker know k such that all counts in [0, k] have support in the input dataset. Next we present an extension of our attack that allows reconstructing counts in the dataset without any prior knowledge about the dataset, but with differentially private access to the dataset.
Emperical Data Reconstruction
Algorithm 4 outlines an attack for reconstructing a dataset using GPTT and differentially private access to the dataset. Algorithm 4 also takes as input a privacy budget ǫ. We split the budget ǫ = ǫ1 + ǫ2. We use ǫ1 to run our GPTT based attack algorithm (Alg 3), which outputs an ordered partition P of the domain. We use the remaining budget ǫ2 to compute noisy total countscP for each partition P ∈ P, and estimate the average count in each partition aP =cP /|P |. We round this average to the nearest integer and guess that each domain element ui ∈ P has count round(aP ).
We run Algorithm 4 on the four datasets. Table 2 shows the fraction of domain elements in each dataset whose counts are correctly guessed by our algorithm for ǫ ∈ {1, 0.5, 0.1}. Each accuracy measure is the average of 10 repetitions. In each experiment, we set ǫ1 = ǫ2 = 0.5ǫ. When ǫ is not small, the counts of most cells can be reconstructed (3 datasets can even be reconstructed over 90% ). With the decreasing of the ǫ, the ratio ǫ = 1.0 ǫ = 0.5 ǫ = 0. Small ǫ1 leads to a coarser partition from the Attack Algorithm. (2) Small ǫ2 introduces much noise to the counts of each group giving us wrong counts. Table 3 displays the accuracy of reconstruction on domain elements with small counts within [0, 5] . Note that more than 1/4 th of the domain has counts in [0, 5] for all the datasets. More than 95% of all domain elements with small counts within [0, 5] can be reconstructed for all these 4 datasets under all settings of ǫ considered. Especially, when the ǫ is not small (e.g.,ǫ = 1.0), nearly all these cells can be accurately reconstructed by using Algorithm 4.
Discussion: These results show that not only does GPTT not satisfy differential privacy, it can lead to significant loss of privacy. Since cells with small counts can be reconstructed with very high accuracy (> 95%), access to the data via GPTT can result in releasing query answers that can allow re-identification attacks. Hence, we believe that systems whose privacy stems from GPTT are not safe to use.
CONCLUSION
We studied the privacy properties of a variant of the sparse vector technique called generalized private threshold testing (GPTT). This technique is claimed to satisfy differential privacy and has impressive utility properties and has found applications in developing privacy preserving algorithms for frequent itemset mining, synthetic data generation and feature selection in machine learning. We show that the technique does not satisfy differential privacy. Moreover, we present attack algorithms that allows us to reconstruct counts from the input dataset (especially small counts) with high accuracy with no prior knowledge about the dataset. Thus, we demonstrate that GPTT is not a safe technique to use on datasets with privacy concerns.
